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Abstract 
A large body of literature has shown that small firms, due to their opaqueness, may find it difficult 
to access the credit market. Informational asymmetries may be mitigated by posting collateral or 
by building relationships with lenders (relationship lending). However, in some cases, due to a lack of 
collateral or of a long credit history, small enterprises may still find it very difficult to raise 
external finance unless alternative contracting schemes emerge. In particular, group lending or 
similarly micro-finance are examples of such alternative lending contracts. In this paper, we 
investigate the effect of mutual guarantee institutions (MGI) on loan interest rates. We argue that, 
similarly to group lending and micro-finance, firms affiliated to a MGI are linked by a joint 
responsibility for the loan providing MGI affiliates with peer monitoring incentives. Indeed, each 
MGI member contributes to the guarantee fund that is then posted as collateral to loans granted to 
MGI members. As a consequence, MGI willingness to post collateral signals firms credit-
worthiness to banks. The econometric analysis supports the hypothesis that these consortia 
improve lending conditions for small firms.  
JEL classification:  D82, G21, G30, O16. 
Keywords: credit guarantee schemes, group lending, joint liability, microfinance, 
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1. Introduction and main conclusions1 
According to the latest available data (European Commission, 2005), 
there are more than 20 millions firms in Europe providing employment for 
more than 140 million people. In terms of employment, over two thirds of all 
jobs are provided by small and medium enterprises (SME). Notwithstanding 
their great importance in the economy, a large body of literature has shown 
that, due to their opaqueness, SME can suffer from difficulties when accessing 
the credit market (Petersen and Rajan, 1994, Berger and Udell, 2004). 
Information asymmetries may be, at least in part, mitigated by posting 
collateral or by building relationships with lenders (relationship lending). 
However, small enterprises, due to a lack of collateral or of a long credit 
history, may still find very difficult to raise external financial resources. 
Other contracting schemes may emerge to mitigate particularly severe 
asymmetric information problems. In particular, group lending (like in 
microfinance loans) is an example of an alternative lending contract in which 
banks, instead of lending to a single borrower, lend to a group of borrowers 
linked by a joint responsibility for the loan.2 One rationale for this alternative 
source of finance being effective in mitigating asymmetric information 
problem is that each member of the group is better informed than banks 
about other members’ characteristics and behavior. Thus, the members 
accepting a joint responsibility for a loan convey a good signal to banks about 
their creditworthiness. Furthermore, under such lending technology, group 
members agree to shoulder a penalty in the case of default by a peer and 
                                                          
1 We would like to thank Elisabetta Cervone, Xavier Freixas, Giorgio Gobbi, Marcello Pagnini, Fabio 
Panetta and Angelo Zago for useful comments. The usual disclaimer applies. The opinions expressed 
in this paper are those of the authors only and in no way involve the responsibility of the Bank of Italy 
or of any other institutions with which the authors may be affiliated.  We also thank Marco Massitti for 
his excellent research assistance.   
2 For a review, see among others, Armendáriz and Morduch (2005). 
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therefore have incentives to monitoring each other3.  
Another reason for group lending being successful in improving credit 
market access for small firms is that, notwithstanding each firm suffers 
individually of a lack of collateral, by joining each other they can provide the 
bank with the social capital within the group.  
In this paper, we analyze the role in lending relationship of Mutual 
guarantee institutions (MGI) that is an institutional device that puts under 
the same responsibility a group of small firms that need bank lending but 
individually have a limited collateral capacity. The functioning of the MGI is 
very simple: each member contributes to the guarantee fund that is then 
posted as collateral to loans granted to MGI members. Since members are 
mostly part of the same local community, as reported from the MGI 
associations a peer-monitoring is in place and our hypothesis is that it 
significantly mitigates moral hazard effects.  
MGI are quite widespread in Europe: on the base of the latest available 
data provided by the European Mutual Guarantee Association, in the European 
Union there are more than 1.4 million of SME affiliated to a MGI. The 
diffusion of mutual consortia is particularly relevant in Germany, France, 
Spain and Italy. Italian MGI represent the largest component of the 
European mutual guarantee sector, since they account for 37 per cent of the 
total outstanding volume of guarantees to SME. 
MGI intervene in the bank-firm relationship in different ways, 
mitigating problems of access to bank loans for SME that have insufficient 
collateral or lack of a sufficient track record or credit history. First, they 
supply personal and real guarantees to the bank that allow a partial coverage 
                                                          
3 This mechanism is similar to a collective credit agreement. As stressed by Armendáriz (1999), in 
contrast to the standard bilateral creditor–borrower debt contracts, such agreements involve, on a 
collective basis, a group of borrowers without collateral who are linked by a ‘‘joint-responsibility’’ 
default clause: if any member of the group defaults, other members have to repay to the bank her share 
of the debt, or else the entire group loses access to future refinancing. 
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of potential losses of SME lending. In the new financial set-up designed by 
Basel II the relevance of these guarantee schemes is growing since they may 
also offer the possibility, under certain conditions, of a mitigation of the risk 
associated with banks’ SME portfolio and a reduction in regulatory capital 
requirements for financial intermediaries.4 Second, MGI negotiate collectively 
interest rates and other conditions with banks. Third, MGI provide screening 
and monitoring activity of affiliated firms that come together with peer-
monitoring activity.  
MGI associations are formed directly by enterprises and are usually 
located in the headquarters of the business associations that promote them, or 
hosted by chambers of commerce. This helps to increase the information 
exchanged between firms within the business association and the MGI 
association. MGI in Italy are typically affiliated to business associations by 
means of federations that provide organizational assistance, including staff 
support, technical equipment and premises. They also lobby local and 
national government and chambers of commerce to provide the MGI 
association with the necessary funds. 
In this paper, we focus on the Italian credit market using a unique 
dataset including loans to small businesses (i.e. firms with less than 20 
employees). We verify whether MGI make firms affiliated with them borrow 
at better conditions than other similar firms. To this aim, we use data on 
individual loans from the Italian Credit Register and the Survey on Loan 
Interest Rates. Since we are interested in identifying the effect of MGI 
affiliation on loan interest rates independently from the collateral posted by 
MGI itself, we focus on overdraft loans, typically not backed by any 
guarantee. In this way, we are able to verify whether or not the MGI 
                                                          
4 The new Basel II accord qualifies most MGI as guarantors, if their guarantee product is in line with 
the regulatory requirement (Gai, 2005; Vallascas, 2005). This will allow banks to reduce regulatory 
capital on their SME loan portfolio. 
 
  
 
 
5 
willingness to post collateral is a good signal for banks. In other terms, we 
test whether MGI are better informed than banks about their firms. 
We also test whether MGI characteristics affect the cost of lending for 
their members. Such tests aim at shedding some light on the internal 
functioning of MGI in order to establish the ultimate causes of the reduction, 
if any, in asymmetric information problems. In particular, we verify whether 
an optimal scale exists for MGI and whether contributions to the guarantee 
fund from the public sector may improve or deteriorate the information 
gathering incentives for MGI. Italy represents an interesting laboratory to 
test for these effects. First, there is wide heterogeneity in MGI size. Second, 
not all MGI receive contributions from local and central governments, 
around 10 per cent of MGI receive such contributions accounting on average 
for more than 50 per cent of the total funds. In theory, public funds may both 
improve or deteriorate the informational efficiency for MGI. On one hand, 
public funds raise a typical problem of moral hazard. On the other hand, it 
could also be the case that the presence of public funds into the MGI may 
convey a positive signal to the lender about the capacity of the MGI of 
attracting more external funds that may be used as additional collateral and 
reduce the risk incurred by a private lender.  
The main results of the paper are the following. First, small firms 
affiliated with a MGI obtain finance at interest rates that are significantly 
lower than other small firms; the benefit is greater for small firms located in 
the South where asymmetric information problems are the most severe. 
Second, affiliated firms have a probability to go into default lower than other 
firms with the same characteristics; the probability to go into default drops 
considerably if the firm is located in the South of Italy. Third, an increase in 
the number of firms affiliated to a MGI improves the peer-monitoring effect 
but up to a limit; when the number of borrowers in the group increases too 
much, the free riding problem overcomes the benefits of peer monitoring 
coming from additional firms. 
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature and 
discusses the effects of a group-lending technology in reducing asymmetric 
information problems in the bank-firm relationship. Section 3 presents some 
facts on the activity and the institutional characteristics of MGIs (more 
details are provided in the Appendix). Empirical results are reported in 
Section 4, while Section 5 discusses robustness of the results considering, 
among other tests, the effects on MGI benefit of the group size and the public 
contribution to the fund.  
2. Some facts on the activity of Mutual guarantee institutions 
Italian MGI are typically constituted under the form of guarantee 
cooperatives, which are non-profit companies for the support of the members 
and with the creation of a syndicated fund. Italian MGI have to be entered in 
a special register (ex art. 107 of the Italian Banking Law) and are subject to 
prudential regulation only when they reach a specific threshold of activity. 
The capital endowment of a MGI (legal capital and risk funds) has to be 
not less than 250.000 euro. Capital and risk funds may also be subscribed by 
third parties (local and central government, chambers of commerce, 
international organizations, business associations). However, at least one fifth 
of the capital endowment has to be paid out by affiliated firms. On the base of 
information released by Fedart and Federconfidi, around one third of MGIs’ 
capital endowment is paid by SME.  
The primary activity of MGI is to provide members with guarantees to 
be posted as collateral to bank loans. For this purpose, a guarantee fund 
(generally monetary) is established and deposited at a bank, being  funded by 
members through fixed membership fees and commissions proportional to the 
loans granted (0.2 to 1.0 per cent of the financing for the duration of the 
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guarantee).5 The bank with which the MGI has an agreement is willing to 
grant credit to member enterprises for a “multiple” of the guarantee fund. In 
Italy the ratio is generally between 10 and 20 and it is linked to the pattern of 
past losses incurred in respect of the mutual guarantee fund. In other 
countries the maximum limit of the “multiplier” may be fixed by national law. 
For example, in Germany and Switzerland the amount of credit granted may 
not exceed 10 times the guarantee. Personal guarantees may also be used: 
they come directly by the affiliated firms and are included in a personal 
guarantee fund managed by the consortium. 
In case of insolvency the bank notifies the MGI of an action to recover 
the loan and requests the guarantee fund to take action. The MGI checks the 
request and if it is justified, authorizes the bank to draw the amount 
corresponding to the risk assumed by the MGI (typically 50 per cent of the 
loss). The bank proceeds with the action to recover the loan, on the 
conclusion of which, it informs the MGI of the degree of success achieved. If 
the action is successful the bank reimburses the amount advanced by the 
guarantee fund. If it is not successful, the loss to the MGI is final.6 
At the end of 2004, more than one half of Italian MGI was affiliated to 
one of the five main federations: Fedart-Fidi (crafts), Federconfidi and 
Fincredit (manufacturing), Federascomfidi and Federfidi (commerce, service 
and tourism), for a total of almost one million of affiliated firms (Table 1). 
MGI in Italy are organized by homogenous activity and this, potentially, may 
increase the overall risk. However, a high degree of positive correlation in 
business activity amplifies peer monitoring and thereby reduces the incidence 
of strategic default; moreover, keeping operations within a limited 
                                                          
5 Some MGIs with a low amount of funding or guarantees may ask for a deposit of around 5 per cent 
of the amount of the loan that is returned when the loan is repaid. 
6 At the second level of the guarantee system, there are sometimes second-tier mutual consortia that 
are set up by groups of MGI. Their function is to reinsure, or in other words to counter-guarantee, 
MGI in order to reach a broader sharing of the financial risk involved. At the same level reinsurance 
entities funded by regional governments may operate. 
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geographical area allows for a thorough knowledge of the local firms. 
The average number of affiliated firms per MGI varies between a 
minimum of 634 in the manufacturing sector to a maximum of 2.598 in the 
commerce sector. The total value of loans backed by mutual guarantees is 
greater than 20 billions euro; around one third is under the form of short-
term lending. Total guarantees amounted to 7.8 billions, with an average 
value of the guarantee-to-loan ratio of more than one third. Guarantees are 
mainly composed by monetary funds that represent between 73 and 90 per 
cent of the total. Personal guarantees are more developed in the 
manufacturing sector where the average size of firms is higher. 
One feature of the Italian MGI system is that it is heterogeneously 
developed among geographical areas. MGI activity is concentrated in the 
North where the presence of small and medium sized firms is more 
widespread. MGI are less developed in the South and the Islands 
(Mezzogiorno) both in terms of number of affiliated firms, average capital of 
consortia and value of guarantees (Figure 1). This may depend not only on 
the small number of firms that have the necessary characteristics to join a 
MGI in this part of Italy but also on other three facts: i) greater availability of 
public funds for firms located in the Mezzogiorno, ii) the relatively recent 
development of MGI system in the South, iii) the high degree of opacity of 
SME in these regions. At the end of 2004, credit guaranteed by MGI 
represented around 8 per cent of total lending to SME in the Mezzogiorno 
against 13 per cent in the Centre and in the North. 
According to information obtained by the Italian Credit Register (CR), 
at the end of June 2005 around 55 per cent of Italian banks (excluding 
branches of foreign banks) lent to SME affiliated with a MGI (Table 2). 
Around one third of firms affiliated to a MGI had lending relationship with 
large banks (those with total assets of more than 20 billions euro); the 
percentage was equal to 22 per cent for medium banks (with total asset 
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between 20 and 7 billions) and to 46 per cent for small banks (those with total 
assets less than 7 billions). 
3. Mutual guarantee institutions, firm strategy and loan interest rate 
setting 
In this section, we describe the mechanism through which a firm decides 
to ask a loan directly to a bank or by means of a MGI. As we discussed above, 
we argue that MGI may mitigate asymmetric information problems in the 
credit market for opaque borrowers, whether their screening technology is 
more accurate than the one available to banks. As a consequence, banks may 
interpret the willingness of MGI to post collateral as a good signal of 
borrowers credit-worthiness, thus lowering loan interest rates.  
From an empirical point of view, the comparison between loan interest 
rates paid by MGI firms and those paid by other firms has to take into 
account the firm lending strategy. 
We can distinguish between two possible cases:  
a)  the borrower asks first a MGI for posting collateral and then asks a 
bank for a loan;  
b)  the borrower asks first a bank for a loan and then, if rejected, may ask 
a MGI for posting collateral and then asks the bank for a loan again. 
In the first case, the pool of applicants for a MGI guarantee is 
potentially the whole set of firms. In practice, due to the high accuracy of 
MGI screening technology, only “good” firms ask a MGI for collateral. In 
other terms, the borrower-MGI matching is endogenous but this endogeneity 
is driven by the high accuracy of MLCG screening technology. In this 
context, the signalling effect of the willingness of MGI to post collateral is 
fully observable. 
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In the second case, the borrower-MGI matching is more complex since 
banks act as a first screener of potential borrowers. In particular, by allowing 
some heterogeneity in banks’ screening technology, we argue that the pool of 
firms asking a MGI for collateral depends not only on MLCG characteristics 
but also on bank screening efficiency. As a consequence, the overall effect of 
the willingness of MGI to post collateral reflects both banks and MLCG 
ability to sort good borrowers. Thus, the more the bank is able to identify 
good borrowers the worst is the average quality of firms asking for a MGI 
collateral since these are firms whose borrowing request has been previously 
rejected from a bank. This adverse effect may be so strong that, 
notwithstanding the higher accuracy of MGI screening technology, we would 
observe that, conditional on the willingness of MGI to post collateral, firms 
pay a higher interest rates compared to other firms.  
Naturally, firms choose between these two possible sequences of actions 
according to their type. Thus, from an empirical point of view we cannot 
disregard the second possible sequence of actions. 
To clarify this point, let assume that firms quality may be high (H), 
medium (M), or low (L) which, in absence of any screening effort, are not 
distinguishable. Low-quality firms are never credit-worthy, medium-quality 
and high-quality firms are always credit-worthy.  
Let also assume that banks may be of two types, depending on the 
accuracy of their screening technology, good (g) and bad (b) banks. The 
quality of banks is common knowledge while firm type is private information. 
The screening technology available to banks is such that:  
 banks are not able to distinguish between H and M type firms but they 
are able to sort L type firms out, even if by a noisy screening 
technology; 
 good banks screening technology is more accurate than bad banks one; 
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 MGI are able to distinguish between L, M and H with some noise. Their 
screening technology of opaque borrowers is more accurate than the one 
available to good banks; 
In this context we analyze firm strategies. Let consider L-firms first. 
The best they can do is to ask a bad bank for a loan. Indeed, in this case the 
probability of rejection is the lowest. However, if rejected, they can ask a 
MGI for collateral and, conditional on the willingness of a MGI to post 
collateral, they can borrow from a bank. In this case, even if the firm is not 
credit-worthy, it can obtain credit just because both the bank and the MLCG 
makes a mistake in evaluating the firm.  
M-firms strategy is more complex. In their case, the best would be to be 
perceived different from L-type firms but indistinguishable from H-type. 
Thus, they ask first a good bank for a loan and, if rejected, they ask a MGI for 
posting collateral. Finally, as far as regards H-type firms, since they want to 
be sorted out from all other firm types the best choice is to go first to MGI. 
How MGI may signal that a firm is perceived by them as a H-firm? We argue 
that MGI may offer two kinds of contract to banks. In particular, they can 
signal to a bank that a firm is of the H-type by their willingness to secure a 
greater amount of lending for H-firms compared to M-ones.  
All in all, this implies that by allowing firms to choose the sequence of 
actions, MGI end up with a pool of applicants which is on average more risky 
compared with the case in which firms are not allowed to choose. In 
particular, the more banks are efficient in screening firms the lower is the 
quality of firms asking for a mutual loan guarantee. It may happen, that the 
gains due to the high screening efficiency of MGI are more than offset by this 
adverse selection effect. 
In terms of the empirical strategy, the fact that the bank-firm-MGI 
matching depends on the relative screening efficiency of banks and MGI, such 
that the pool of firms asking for a mutual loan guarantee is biased towards 
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more risky borrowers, implies that if a bias eventually exists it is against the 
hypothesis that MGI are better able than banks at gathering information 
about small firms. Thus, even in the worst case, i.e. we fail to control for that, 
we would underestimate the effect of mutual loan guarantee on loan interest 
rates.    
4. Data and empirical strategy 
In this section we study how MGI help in mitigating the asymmetric 
information problems that typically characterize the credit relations between 
small firms and banks. In particular, we intend to verify if the interest rates 
applied on current account loans to firms affiliated with MGI are, other 
things being equal, lower than those applied to other firms. Moreover, we 
want to analyze the ability of the consortia to select properly affiliated firms 
in terms of risk. 
To verify whether firms associated with a MGI obtain, other things 
being equal, more favorable financing conditions with respect to the other 
firms we focused on overdraft loans where the presence of guarantees of MGI 
is very limited. The analysis of this category of loan therefore allows to fully 
appreciating the signaling effect linked with being a member of a MGI. 
Moreover, as underlined by Berger and Udell (1995) and by Chakraborty and 
Hu (2006), the asymmetric information problems are more relevant for 
overdraft loans that, because of their nature, are less influenced by the 
particular projects financed. 
The sample is constituted of all the small enterprises (artisan firms and 
other firms with less than 20 employees) that, on the basis of the data in the 
Italian Credit Register, had a loan in June 20057. Interest rates applied to the 
                                                          
7 The firms affiliated with MGIs typically have less than 250 employees. The universe of the artisan 
firms and of the other small enterprises (with less than 20 employees) represents the category closer to 
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overdraft loans have been obtained from the analytical survey on interest 
rates. Our analysis will focus therefore on those firms included in the Italian 
Credit Register borrowing from banks participating in the Survey on loan 
interest rates. The final sample is given by  263,000 small firms, of which 
46,000 (17 per cent) had a guarantee given by MGI. The MGI considered in 
the analysis are 600 after trimming some data for lack of observations.  
The econometric analysis has been performed by means of the following 
equation: 
(1) 
ihihihi
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where i =1,…,Ni represents the firm, h=1,…,Nh indicates the bank, j=1,…,Nj 
is the economic activity sector.  
The interest rate applied to the i-th firm on the overdraft loan given by the 
bank h-th net of the commissions (rih), depends both on the firm and the bank 
characteristics. The characteristics of the firm are the affiliation with a 
Mutual Loan Guarantee Consortium (dummy MGI), the geographic location 
(dummy South), the registration in the artisan firms register (dummy Art), the 
firm size (the log of the loan, Size), the economic activity sector (dummy 
Sector). 
A fixed effect Bankh accounts for the characteristics of the supply of credit 
of every intermediary. Among the other explanatory variables, the dummy 
Monoi denotes if the i-th firm has a credit relation only with the h-th bank, the 
dummy Garovih takes into consideration the presence of real guarantees on the 
                                                                                                                                                                     
that of the firms affiliated with a MGI. The classification by customer economic activity sector allows 
actually to distinguish between firms with less than 20 employees and with more than 20 employees. 
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examined overdraft loan8 and the dummy Gartot  denotes if the financing 
bank receives any guarantee (personal or real) in front of the total loans given 
to a particular firm. The latter variable allows controlling, on the one hand, 
for non observable characteristics of the firm (see Coco, 2000) and, on the 
other hand, for possible effects of a cross-subsidization between the 
guarantees given on different categories of financing. In case of bankruptcy, 
actually the guarantees for a mortgage loan could, for example raise the 
recovery rate of the overdraft loans if their value exceeds that of the loan to 
which are specifically attached. 
5. Results 
5.1 The effects of MGI on loan interest rates 
Results are reported in Table 3. The β1 coefficient in the first column 
indicates that, coeteris paribus, firms guaranteed by MGIs obtain interest 
rates lower by almost 0.2 percentage points.  
The other regressors show the expected signs. The financing cost is 
negatively correlated with the size of the firm. Small enterprises are typically 
more opaque (often the assets of the family owning the firm are not easily 
distinguished from the assets of the firm, moreover balance sheets are not 
very detailed) and this leads to a higher credit risk reflected in the interest 
rate.  
The financing cost is higher for the firms with loans only from one bank, in 
line with the theoretical contributions that show that closer relations between 
bank and firm may be associated with information rents (Sharpe, 1990; Rajan, 
1992). The existence of real guarantees eases the recovery of the credit in case 
                                                          
8 The only guarantees that may be attached to an overdraft loan are the real ones. In our sample we 
find those guarantees only in 5 per cent of the observations. Personal guarantees, typically given on 
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of insolvency and is therefore associated with an interest rate lower by around 
one per cent. The positive sign of the coefficient of the dummy Gartot is 
coherent with the hypothesis that banks ask riskier firms for more guarantees 
(Berger and Udell, 1990 and 1995). Finally, artisan firms pay 3 basis points 
more than the other firms.  
Results imply moreover that the small Southern firms pay on average a 
higher interest rate with respect to the firms in the rest of Italy (the 
difference is equal to 25 basis points) coherently with other empirical works 
(Panetta, 2003).  
This latter result, however, does not allow ascertaining if in Southern 
Italy there are systematic differences between firms members of a MGI and 
the others.  
The robustness of these results has been checked in a number of ways.  
 
a) Additional controls for firm riskiness and bank entry 
In the second column of Table 3 we report the estimates obtained by 
adding three additional controls: two for the riskiness of the firm and one for 
the pricing policy of the bank. The coefficient for MGI is almost unaffected.  
The dummy Over and the dummy Bad, indicate, respectively, that the 
loan is classified as overdue or bad from at least one of the banks lending to 
the firm. The coefficients indicate that, as expected, interest rates are on 
average higher (of 1.6 and 1.9 percentage points respectively). The dummy 
Entry indicating that the h-th bank has opened its first branch in the province 
where the firm has the legal head-quarter since less than three years. This 
variable is meant to verify if the results are somehow affected by specific 
pricing policies adopted from the banks in the areas of new location. The 
                                                                                                                                                                     
the total of the loans, may not be linked to a specific loan category. The fidejussion guarantees, even if 
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results indicate that, other things being equal, banks apply interest rates on 
average lower by 0.2 percentage points in the provinces of new location. This 
more aggressive pricing policy nevertheless, as well as the two controls for 
the riskiness of the firm, does not modify the other results. 
b) Banks operating with at least a MGI 
In the third column of Table 3, we restricted our sample only to the banks 
which have an operating relationship with a MGI. The rationale for this test 
is that some firms may have relationships only with banks which do not 
operate with any MGI. If these firms are, for some reasons, riskier than 
average then our previous results may be biased. However, even after having 
restricted our sample to banks operating with a MGI we do not detect any 
significant changes in our previous results. 
 
c) Multiple lending and firm fixed effects  
In the fourth column of Table 3 we have verified if the results are still valid 
also considering only firms that borrowed from more than one bank. The 
results, that employ a halved number of observations, to 150,000, do not 
evidence relevant differences. Apart from that, since we are taking into 
account only firms borrowing from more than one bank, these sub-sample 
allows to introduce firm fixed effects. Results are reported in the fifth column 
of Table 3. Again the coefficient for MGI is negative. It is also interesting to 
note that the estimated effect of mutual loan guarantees is stronger when firm 
fixed effects are used. This is due to the fact that in this way we control for 
both observable and unobservable characteristics of firms. Our result seems 
to support the hypothesis reported in Section 3 that, on average, the pool of 
applicants for a mutual loan guarantee is made of riskier firms compared to 
the whole population of firms.  
                                                                                                                                                                     
not referred to the overdraft loan, are nonetheless controlled for with the dummy Gartot. 
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d) Geographical fixed effects  
In Table 4 we have controlled for the possible presence of specific 
geographical effects. In this way we aim at controlling for provincial effects 
that could affect both banks’ interest rate setting and MGI affiliation but are 
not related to a MGI informational effect. The main results stay unchanged. 
We also have estimated equation (2) of Table 3 by adding fixed provincial 
effects without detecting any important changes in the variable of interest. 
 
e) Cooperative banks 
Among banks, cooperative banks are those intermediaries whose 
characteristics resemble the most those of MGI. These banks are very small, 
their geographical reach is typically limited to few close towns and they lend 
mostly to their members. Thus, cooperative banks seem to be a close 
substitute for mutual loan guarantee since it is quite unreasonable that they 
are less able than MGI at screening and monitoring borrowers. Despite this 
we observe that even cooperative banks operate with MGI. The reasons for 
that may be quite different compared to other banks. In this case, cooperative 
bank might be just buying credit risk protection for those borrowers they 
know they are highly risky.  
The results in Table 5 show that affiliation to a MGI guarantee for 
firms borrowing from cooperative banks raises the interest rate paid. This is 
in line with the intuition provided in Section 2: if a bank has an accurate 
screening technology firms asking for a mutual loan guarantee come from a 
pool of applicants of an overall lower quality.  
Also, these results support the view that the reason for a mutual loan 
guarantee lowering interest rates is linked to a better ability of MGI at 
dealing with asymmetric information problems. 
  
 
 
18 
 
f) An alternative estimation methodology 
Table 6 reports the results obtained by using a treatment effect model, 
where the selection equation for the decision of the firm to join a MGI 
includes social capital endowments as proxied by the number of blood 
donations per inhabitant, the extent of the black economy, to proxy for the 
lack of social trust, being part of the artisan, retail or building sectors in 
which the presence of small firms and hence of MGI is higher. We also 
include a specific  control for those firms that have  received some financial 
aid from central or local governments (State).  
Both the first column for the baseline model and the second one for the 
more complete model with additional controls for risk, show that results are 
pretty robust.  
The results shown in the selection equation are also interesting. The 
probability for a firm to be backed by a mutual loan guarantee increases with 
the social capital endowment of the province where the firm is headquartered, 
while it is negatively correlated with the size of the black economy. A higher 
probability is also observed for those firms which obtain financial aid from the 
central or local governments. This may capture the fact that MGI supply 
technical support and advice to firms that apply for financial public aid. 
5.2 Deeper into the effects of MGIs characteristics on loan interest rates 
To fully bring into the picture the role of peer-monitoring in MGIs we 
have tried to insulate the effect of the MGI size and the role of external funds 
provided by public or semi-public bodies (see Table 7). 
To perform this test we have restricted our sample to those firms 
backed by a mutual loan guarantee. As a consequence, in order to get 
unbiased estimates, we have to model the affiliation choice. To this aim we 
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use the Heckman procedure by modeling the sample selection in the same 
way as we did for the treatment estimation before. 
Intuitively, a larger group size tends to increase peer monitoring 
effectiveness but until a certain point because a higher number of firms in the 
MGI also increases the scope for free riding in debt-repayment decisions. 
Therefore we expect that an increase in the number of firms in a MGI will 
initially determine a lower interest rates since the bank is better insured 
against individual defaults; however at a certain point, when the number of 
borrowers in the group increases too much, the free riding problem should 
overcome the benefits of peer monitoring coming from additional firms and 
the interest rate should start to rise.  
Table 7 shows this test using a model that includes the MGI size both in 
linear (Firms) and quadratic form (Firms2). From the estimated coefficients it 
is possible to analyze the relationship between the number of firms associated 
to a MGI and the interest rate paid on average by an affiliated firm. Figure 2 
shows this relationship over the entire range of the number of firms observed 
in our sample (from a minimum of nearly zero to a maximum of 21.200 firms 
in a single MGI). The interest rate initially declines, because of the positive 
effect of peer-monitoring, reaching a minimum value when the number of 
firms in a MGI is around 8,500. Beyond this threshold the interest rate paid 
by affiliated firms starts increasing and the benefit to be part of a MGI 
vanishes when the consortium has a number of participants that is equal to 
17,000.  
In order to evaluate the role of external funds provided by public or 
semi-public bodies we have also inserted in the specification reported in Table 
7 a dummy variable that takes the value of one if financial support is provided 
to the MGI by local and national government authority. As discussed above, 
public funds may both improve or deteriorate the informational efficiency for 
MGI. On one hand, public funds raise a typical problem of moral hazard. On 
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the other, it could also be the case that the presence of public funds into the 
MGI may convey a positive signal to the lender about the capacity of the 
MGI of attracting more external funds that may be used as additional 
collateral and reduce the risk incurred by a private lender. The result 
reported in table 7 shows that the moral hazard effect prevails and 13 
additional basis points are paid on interest rates, other things being equal, by 
firms that are affiliated to a “public MGI”. This means that the positive 
signaling effect for a MGI of having public funds is compensated by the 
negative effect given by a relaxation of the selection criteria. 
5.3 Are small firms affiliated to a MGI less risky? 
The analysis presented in the previous section shows that firms which 
are affiliated to a MGI obtain significant gains on their financing conditions. 
The evidence provided so far, however, does not explain explicitly if such 
gains come from a lower riskiness of these firms. In this section, therefore, we 
aim at verifying this hypothesis directly, by means of the probability that a 
small firm belonging to a MGI has to go into default.  
The sample is composed by around 385,000 small firms, of which more 
than 50,000 had a guarantee given by MGIs9. Table 8 highlights a 
remarkable difference in the ratio between bad loans and lending among firms 
in the two Italian areas; in June 2005 the ratio was equal to 7 per cent in 
Central and Northern Italy and 23 per cent for the Southern firms10. 
However, the difference in the quality of bank lending between the two 
Italian areas drops drastically when we limit our observation only to firms 
                                                          
9
 The number of firms used in this execise is greater than that used in the previous section because the 
analytical survey on interest rates used in section 5 gathers information only from a sub-sample of 
Italian banks. 
10 These ratios are very similar to those calculated for all small firms in the two areas (6 and 19 per 
cent, respectively) confirming the reliability of the sample used in our econometric analysis. 
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which are affiliated to a MGI; in this case the ratio is equal to 4 per cent in the 
Centre and in the North and 6 per cent in the Mezzogiorno. 
The analysis of the ratio between bad loans and lending is not sufficient 
however to establish if firms which are affiliated to a MGI are on average less 
risky. The low ratio is very likely influenced also by the fact that banks obtain 
directly from the MGI a substantial coverage of losses in the case of defaults 
and this mechanically reduces the amount of their credit portfolio that is 
considered “bad”. In other words, bad loans may be lower in the case of a firm 
affiliated to a MGI just because of the direct use of the guarantee fund. On the 
base of the data provided by Fedart-Fidi, in the occurrence of a firm’s default 
in more than 50 per cent of the cases banks proceed with an immediate action 
to obtain the guarantee funds: this determines an immediate reduction in the 
volume of bad loans. In one quarter of the cases the bank may set aside on 
their pledge account the guaranteed share; in the remaining cases the 
excussion occurs at the end of the legal procedure. In all cases, time to 
recovery of credit positions is greatly reduced and this determines a low ratio 
between bad debt and total lending. 
In order to evaluate if firms associated with a MGI are, other things being 
equal, less risky with respect to other small firms, we estimate the probability 
that a unit of lending is classified as bad loans taking into account firm-
specific characteristics: affiliation with a MGI, geographic position, 
application to the register for artisan companies, firm’s dimension, sector of 
economic activity. 
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In particular, the econometric analysis has been carried out using the 
following probit model that evaluate the probability that the i-th firm is 
classified in default from at least one of the banks that grant it credit (Pr(soff 
= 1)). 
(2)   
)543210(1Pr
1
∑
=
++++++==
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Results reported in Table 9 show that, coeteris paribus, small firms 
affiliated to a MGI have a probability to go into default of 5 per cent less with 
respect to other companies with the same characteristics.  
All other explanatory variables have the predicted signs. For firms 
borrowing from only one bank default probability drops of 11 percentage 
points; this evidence is coherent with the hypothesis of a higher quality of 
screening and monitoring activity by intermediaries that are engaged in strict 
lending relationship (Petersen and Rajan, 1994) and their greater propensity 
to debt restructuring (Berglof and Von Thadden, 1994; Bolton and 
Scharfstein, 1990). The probability that a unit of loan of a Southern firm is 
classified as a bad debt is 13 percentage points higher than for other 
companies in the sample; it is significantly lower for big firms. 
The second column of Table 9 reports a different specification that 
considers as additional explanatory variable the interaction term 
(δ6*MGI*South). Results show that affiliation to a MGI for a Southern firm 
can be associated to a probability to be classified as bad debt that is lower of 
around 11 percentage points (δ1+δ6 = -0.111). This probability is higher of 
one percentage points for small Southern firms that have business 
relationship with only one bank, while it is lower of 5 percentage points if 
these firms are affiliated to a MGI. 
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These results may depend upon the fact that banks that operate with 
MGI have specific characteristics. For example, such banks may have a 
greater attitude toward renegotiation of debt with respect to other 
intermediaries determining a lower number of bad loans. To verify the 
reliability of previous results we have integrated our probit specification with 
dummies that capture specific aspects relative to each bank. Results confirm 
that the existence of group lending has positive effect on credit quality even 
though effects are slightly reduced. 
In order to corroborate these results the analysis has been repeated to 
estimate the default probability of firms which are affiliated to a MGI. In 
particular, the estimation model used above has been adapted in order to 
explain the probability that a firm is declared in default over the period June 
2004 - June 2005 (Table 10). This test is particularly interesting because the 
affiliation to a MGI may reduce statistically the volume of bad loans simply 
because a significant part of the credit position is repaid. Although, 
considering the fact that excussion is generally equal to 50 per cent of the 
value of the loan, it is unlikely that the total position is taken away from the 
credit register in a year. In this way it is possible to overcome the problems 
that we have in estimating the probability that a unit of loan is into default. 
The analysis confirms previous results. In particular, the probability that a 
small firm goes into default is reduced by around one percentage point in case 
of affiliation in group-lending. The reduction increased to 3 per cent if the 
firm has his legal headquarter in the South. Even in this case the introduction 
of bank-fixed effects, that capture different attitude among intermediaries 
towards debt restructuring, does not modify the results of the analysis. 
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Table 1 
 
MUTUAL GUARANTEE INSTITUTIONS (MGIs) ACTIVITY IN ITALY IN 2004 (1) 
(millions euro, percentage values) 
Short 
term
Medium 
and long 
term
Monetary 
fund
Personal 
guarantees
Fedart-Fidi Crafts 314 667,482 2,126 8,494 38.0 62.0 15.7 4,022 80.0 20.0
Federconfidi Industry 74 46,901 634 7,140 31.1 68.9 4.4 752 73.3 26.7
Fincredit Industry 25 34,561 1,382 1,809 …. …. 17.6 1,013 …. ….
FederascomfidiCommerce, Service and Tourism 67 174,052 2,598 3,100 27.7 72.3 13.0 1,368 90.0 10.0
Federfidi Commerce, Service and Tourism 34 70,000 2,059 …. …. …. …. 640 …. ….
(1) Data are supplied by each Federation. - (2) As for Fedart-Fidi data refers to 208 MLGCs taking part to a special survey. - (3) Data have been provided by Italian Foreign 
Exchange Office.
514 992,996 20,543 33.7 66.3 12.6
Sector
Capital / 
guarantees
(2)
Federations
18.681.4
Guarantee
d lending
Number of 
SMEs for 
MLGC 
(b)/(a)
1,932
Guarantees 
(2)
7,795
Number 
of 
affiliated 
SMEs (b)
Total Italy (3) 1,073
Number of 
affiliated 
MLGCs (a)
Total of the 5 Federations
 
 
Table 2 
BANKS WITH AGREEMENTS IN PLACE WITH MUTUAL GUARANTEE INSTITUTIONS (MGIs)(1) 
Cooperative 
banks 
Number of banks with agreements in place with MLGCs: (a) 17 24 355 260 396
Number of active banks (foreign branches excluded): (b) 22 33 665 440 720
     - as % of size category: (a)/(b)*100 77.3 72.7 53.4 59.1 55.0
     - as % of total (a)/396*100 4.3 6.1 89.6 65.7 100.0
Number of MLGCs in Credit Registry 365 281 512 278 600
     - as % of total MLGCs in credit Registry 60.8 46.8 85.3 46.3 100.0
Number of firms assisted and with loans guaranteed by MLGCs: (c) 18,857 12,776 27,198 9,446 58,831
Total number of firms with granted loans: (d) 180,528 94,310 205,644 78,043 480,482
    - as % of firms assisted and with granted loans by MLGCs: 
(c)/(d)*100
10.4 13.5 13.2 12.1 12.2
    - as % of total:  (c )/58.831 32.1 21.7 46.2 16.1 100.0
Percentage of the overall credit to SMEs guaranteed by MLGCs 8.3 13.5 13.2 12.1 9.3
Sources: Credit Registry and Italian Foreign Exchange Office.
(1) Guarantees granted to craftsman firms and to other firms with less than 20 employees.
Total
Small banks 
(2)
Medium 
banks (2)
Big banks 
(2)
(2) Banks are classified by size of total assets: of more than 20 billions euro for large banks,  between 20 and 7 billions for medium banks, of less than 
7 billions for small banks.
Table 3 
MGI AND BANKS’ INTEREST RATE SETTING 
Explicative variables
-0.181 *** -0.198 *** -0.190 *** -0.209 *** -0.361 ***
0.011 0.011 0.011 0.020 0.021
0.253 *** 0.225 *** 0.191 *** 0.141 ***
0.016 0.016 0.016 0.022
0.031 *** 0.034 *** 0.039 *** 0.035 **
0.012 0.012 0.012 0.017
-0.086 *** -0.100 *** -0.101 *** -0.139 ***
0.005 0.005 0.005 0.008
0.373 *** 0.391 *** 0.387 ***
0.009 0.009 0.009
-1.304 *** -1.368 *** -1.354 *** -0.696 *** -1.196 ***
0.019 0.019 0.019 0.029 0.033
0.982 *** 0.977 *** 0.973 *** 0.428 *** 0.205 ***
0.010 0.009 0.100 0.018 0.032
1.579 *** 1.590 *** 1.579 ***
0.021 0.021 0.026
1.921 *** 1.925 *** 2.139 ***
0.039 0.040 0.073
-0.177 *** -0.222 *** -0.222 *** -0.205 **
0.022 0.023 0.031 0.018
10.298 *** 10.439 *** 10.439 *** 10.828 9.261 ***
2.490 2.461 2.461 8,195           0.037
adjusted R
2 
0.205 0.223 0.224 0.196 0.146
Number of observations 347,461 347,461 336,724 149,837 149,837
The dependent variable is the interest rate on overdraft loans for firms with less than 20 employees and for artisan firms. OLS estimates with fixed 
effects for economic activity sector and for lending bank. Fixed effects are not reported. Standard errors with white correction are in italics. *** 1 
per cent significance. ** 5 per cent. * 10 per cent.
(3)
Only banks with 
an operating 
relationship with 
at least a MLGC
bad loan (Bad )
real guarantees on overdraft loan (Garov )
Southern Italy firm (South )
artisan firm (Art )
log of loan used (Size )
firm guaranteed from a MLGC (MLGC )
(1)
 Benchmark equation
costant (α )
overdue loan (Over )
(5)                   
Only firms with 
lending from 
more than one 
bank and fixed 
effects for every 
firm
bank with a branch in the province where the firm 
is located since less than 3 years (Entry )
(4)
Only firms with 
lending from more 
than one bank
firm borrowing from only one bank (Mono )
(2)
Additional controls 
for risk (firms 
temporarily distressed 
or bankrupt) and for 
entry of a bank in the 
province where the 
firm is located
existence of any type of guarantee on other credit 
lines (Gartot )
 
 
Table 4 
MODELS WITH GEOGRAPHICAL CONTROLS:  
FIXED PROVINCIAL DUMMIES 
Explicative variables
-0.118 *** -0.138 ***
0.011 0.011
0.081 *** 0.083 ***
0.012 0.012
-0.091 *** -0.106 ***
0.051 0.005
0.035 *** 0.374 ***
0.009 0.009
-1.362 *** -1.424 ***
0.021 0.020
0.971 *** 0.967 ***
0.010 0.010
1.581 ***
0.019
1.874 ***
0.039
-0.076 ***
0.023
adjusted R
2 
0.231 0.249
Number of observations 347,420 347,420
The dependent variable is the interest rate on overdraft loans for firms with less 
than 20 employees and for artisan firms. OLS estimates with fixed effects for 
province, economic activity sector and for lending bank. Fixed effects are not 
reported. Standard errors with white correction are in italics. *** 1 per cent 
significance. ** 5 per cent. * 10 per cent.
(1)
 Benchmark 
equation
(2)
Additional controls 
for risk (firms 
temporarily 
distressed or 
bankrupt) and for 
entry of a bank in 
the province where 
the firm is located
firm guaranteed from a MLGC (MLGC )
overdue loan (Over )
bad loan (Bad )
bank with a branch in the province where 
the firm is located since less than 3 years 
existence of any type of guarantee on other 
credit lines (Gartot )
real guarantees on overdraft loan (Garov )
artisan firm (Art )
log of loan used (Size )
firm borrowing from only one bank (Mono )
 
Table 5 
IN THE PRESENCE OF SMALL BANKS THE EFFECTS OF MGIS DISAPPEAR  
Explicative variables
0.165 *** 0.116 *** 0.276 *** 0.135 ***
0.037 0.037 0.046 0.037
-0.448 *** -0.508 *** 0.200 -1.131 ***
0.143 0.141 0.272 0.161
0.045 0.043 0.043 *** 0.057
0.041 0.040 0.060 0.408
-0.152 *** -0.159 *** -0.224 *** -0.163 ***
0.015 0.014 0.025 0.014
0.265 *** 0.297 *** 0.299 ***
0.030 0.029 0.030
-1.657 *** -1.762 *** -0.951 *** -1.741 ***
0.054 0.054 0.082 0.054
1.018 *** 0.976 *** 0.381 *** 0.971 ***
0.030 0.029 0.053 0.030
1.507 *** 1.407 *** 1.513 ***
0.063 0.083 0.063
1.927 *** 2.397 *** 1.839 ***
0.164 0.339 0.167
-0.097 -0.119 -0.067
0.097 0.127 0.100
8.560 *** 8.652 *** 5.885 *** 9.902 ***
2.082 2.055 1.901            2.055
adjusted R
2 
0.303 0.322 0.288 0.325
Number of observations 25,721 25,721 9,468 25,295
***
Sample composed of cooperative banks only. The dependent variable is the interest rate on overdraft loans for firms with less 
than 20 employees and for artisan firms. OLS estimates with fixed effects for economic activity sector and for lending bank. 
Fixed effects are not reported. Standard errors with white correction are in italics. *** 1 per cent significance. ** 5 per cent. * 10 
per cent.
costant (α )
overdue loan (Over )
bank with a branch in the province where the firm is 
located since less than 3 years (Entry )
firm borrowing from only one bank (Mono )
bad loan (Bad )
real guarantees on overdraft loan (Garov )
(2)
Additional controls 
for risk (firms 
temporarily distressed 
or bankrupt) and for 
entry of a bank in the 
province where the 
firm is located
existence of any type of guarantee on other credit 
lines (Gartot )
(3)
Only firms with 
lending from more 
than one bank
(4)
Only banks with 
an operating 
relationship with 
at least a MLGC
Southern Italy firm (South )
artisan firm (Art )
log of loan used (Size )
firm guaranteed from a MLGC (MLGC )
(1)
 Benchmark equation
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Table 6 
MODELS TO TACKLE SELECTION BIAS: TREATMENT EFFECTS 
Explicative variables
-0.622 *** -0.551 ***
0.071 0.071
0.171 *** 0.153 **
0.018 0.018
0.081 *** 0.073 ***
0.019 0.019
-0.067 *** -0.083 ***
0.006 0.006
0.405 *** 0.417 ***
0.012 0.012
-1.279 *** -1.326 ***
0.024 0.023
0.951 *** 0.954 ***
0.012 0.012
1.523 ***
0.026
1.902 ***
0.048
-0.224 ***
0.026
10.191 *** 10.331 ***
2.550 2.521
0.006 *** 0.006 ***
0.001 0.001
-0.026 *** -0.026 ***
0.001 0.001
0.569 *** 0.569 ***
0.006 0.006
0.047 *** 0.047 ***
0.007 0.007
-0.118 *** -0.118 ***
0.009 0.009
1.228 *** 1.230 ***
0.023 0.023
0.092 *** 0.074 ***
0.015 0.016
Wald Chi
2 
39,684 45,616
Number of  observations 230,492 230,492
State support (State)
Rho
(1)
 Benchmark equation
The dependent variable is the interest rate on overdraft loans for firms with less than 20 
employees and for artisan firms. Maximum likelihood estimates of a treatment effects model 
with fixed effects for economic activity sector and for lending bank. Standard errors with 
white correction are in italics. *** 1 per cent significance. ** 5 per cent. * 10 per cent.
overdue loan (Over )
bank with a branch in the province where the firm is 
located since less than 3 years (Entry )
firm borrowing from only one bank (Mono )
(2)
Additional controls 
for risk (firms 
temporarily distressed 
or bankrupt) and for 
entry of a bank in the 
province where the 
firm is located
existence of any type of guarantee on other credit 
lines (Gartot )
blood donations (Blood)
selection equation for MLGC
costant (α )
bad loan (Bad )
real guarantees on overdraft loan (Garov )
Southern Italy firm (South )
artisan firm (Art )
log of loan used (Size )
firm guaranteed from a MLGC (MLGC )
artisan firm (Art )
retail sector firm (Retail)
building sector firm (Building)
black economy (black)
 
Table 7 
TESTS ON THE PEER MONITORING EFFECT: GROUP SIZE AND PUBLIC MGIS 
Explicative variables
-0.284 ***
0.066
-0.025
0.042
-0.033 *
0.017
0.249 ***
0.027
-0.437 ***
0.057
0.465 ***
0.030
1.507 ***
0.053
2.103 ***
0.108
-0.268 ***
0.058
-0.153 ***
0.110
0.009 ***
0.001
0.129 ***
0.044
9.763 ***
2.477
0.006 ***
0.001
-0.026 ***
0.001
0.570 ***
0.006
0.042 ***
0.007
-0.121 ***
0.009
1.243 ***
0.023
Wald Chi
2 
16,990
Number of uncensored observations 45,620
State support (State)
bad loan (Bad )
real guarantees on overdraft loan (Garov )
Southern Italy firm (South )
artisan firm (Art )
log of loan used (Size )
(1)
 Benchmark equation
The dependent variable is the interest rate on overdraft loans for firms with 
less than 20 employees and for artisan firms. Maximum likelihood estimates 
of an Heckman model with fixed effects for economic activity sector and for 
lending bank. Standard errors with white correction are in italics. *** 1 per 
cent significance. ** 5 per cent. * 10 per cent.
overdue loan (Over )
firm borrowing from only one bank (Mono )
existence of any type of guarantee on other credit 
lines (Gartot )
black economy (black)
blood donations (Blood)
selection equation for MLGC
costant (α )
public funds in MLGC (Public )
thousands of firms in MLGC (Firms)
thousands of firms in MLGC squared (Firms 
squared)
artisan firm (Art )
retail sector firm (Retail)
building sector firm (Building)
bank with a branch in the province where the firm is 
located since less than 3 years (Entry )
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Table 8 
RATIO BETWEEN BAD LOANS AND TOTAL LOANS IN JUNE 2005 
(Percentage values) 
Agriculture Manufacturing Building Retail Services Totale
Number of 
Firms
% 
Small firms in sample
Centre-North 4.5 7.6 8.0 8.4 4.1 6.6 308,732 80.2
South 23.9 23.3 33.2 27.3 16.3 22.9 76,401 19.8
Italy 8.1 10.2 13.0 13.4 6.3 9.8 385,133 100.0
Small firms in sample 
guaranteed by MLGC 
Centre-North 1.7 4.4 4.4 4.3 2.9 3.5 46,450 12.1
South 3.0 4.6 14.7 4.4 4.3 6.2 3,963 1.0
Italy 2.3 4.5 9.6 4.3 3.6 4.9 50,413 13.1
For comparison: 
Small firms total
Centre-North 5.0 7.4 6.8 7.1 4.5 6.1 2,957,451 72.8
South 18.1 21.3 26.6 18.6 12.5 19.0 1,102,654 27.2
Italy 8.0 11.1 11.0 9.1 5.8 8.7 4,060,105 100.0
Sources: Credit Register (for small firms; not available data on loans for an amount smaller than 75,000 euro and in good standing); Italian National 
Institute of Statistics, Eighth general census of manufacturing and services; Supervisory statistics (for the small firms total).  
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Table 9 
ARE SMALL FIRMS AFFILIATED TO A MGI LESS RISKY EX-POST? 
Explicative variables
-0.056 *** -0.052 *** -0.053 *** -0.038 ***
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
0.135 *** 0.138 *** 0.126 *** 0.046 ***
0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003
-0.020 *** -0.020 *** -0.020 *** -0.016 ***
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
-0.017 *** -0.017 *** -0.017 *** -0.019 ***
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
-0.107 *** -0.107 *** -0.111 *** -0.059 ***
0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001
-0.058 *** -0.047 *** -0.037 ***
0.002 0.004 0.005
0.011 *** 0.032 ***
0.002 0.003
-0.053 *** -0.041 ***
0.006 0.007
Pseudo R
2 
0.127 0.128 0.128 0.347
Log-likelihood -109,453 -109,342 -109,341 -81,771
Number of observations 385,008 385,008 385,008 384,424
The dependent variable is the probability that a firm has a bad debt with at least one of the lending banks. Probit
estimates with fixed effects for economic activity sector. Marginal effects computed for a discrete variation of the
dummy variables form 0 to 1. Fixed effects are not reported. Standard errors with white correction are in italics. ***
1 per cent significance. ** 5 per cent. * 10 per cent.
(1)
 Benchmark 
equation
(2)                        
Differential effects 
of MLGC in 
Southern Italy
(3) Differential 
effects of MLGC 
in Southern Italy 
for a firm 
borrowing only 
form one bank 
South firm guaranteed from a MLGC 
borrowing from only one bank 
(Mono*South*MLGC )
South firm guaranteed from a MLGC 
(MLGC*South )
(4)
Bank fixed effects
South firm borrowing from only one bank 
(Mono*South )
firm borrowing from only one bank 
(Mono )
log of loan used (Size )
artisan firm (Art )
Southern Italy firm (South )
firm guaranteed from a MLGC (MLGC )
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            Table 10
  
ARE SMALL FIRMS AFFILIATED TO A MGI LESS PRONE TO BECOME RISKY? 
 
Explicative variables
-0.016 *** -0.014 *** -0.015 *** -0.008 ***
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
0.035 *** 0.036 *** 0.026 *** 0.001
0.002 -0.032 0.003 0.001
-0.032 *** -0.033 *** -0.032 *** -0.021 ***
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
-0.011 *** -0.011 *** -0.011 *** -0.012 ***
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
-0.046 *** -0.046 *** -0.051 *** -0.029 ***
0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001
-0.021 *** -0.016 *** -0.008 ***
0.002 0.002 0.003
0.011 *** 0.027 ***
0.002 0.002
-0.019 *** -0.019 ***
0.003 0.003
Pseudo R
2 
0.113 0.114 0.115 0.174
Log-likelihood -60,024 -59,980 -59,935 -55,886
Number of observations 385,008 385,008 385,008 383,764
Southern Italy firm (South )
The dependent variable is the probability that a firm was classified between June 2004 and June 2005 as having a
bad debt with at least one of the lending banks. Probit estimates with fixed effects for economic activity sector.
Marginal effects computed for a discrete variation of the dummy variables form 0 to 1. Fixed effects are not
reported. Standard errors with white correction are in italics. *** 1 per cent significance. ** 5 per cent. * 10 per
cent.
(1)
 Benchmark 
equation
(2)                        
Differential effects 
of MLGC in 
Southern Italy
firm guaranteed from a MLGC (MLGC )
South firm guaranteed from a MLGC 
borrowing from only one bank 
(Mono*South*MLGC )
South firm guaranteed from a MLGC 
(MLGC*South )
(4)
Bank fixed effects
South firm borrowing from only one bank 
(Mono*South )
(3) Differential 
effects of MLGC 
in Southern Italy 
for a firm 
borrowing only 
form one bank 
firm borrowing from only one bank 
(Mono )
log of loan used (Size )
artisan firm (Art )
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